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Operational contract support (OCS), as defined in Department of Defense 
Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support, is “the ability to orchestrate and 
synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor 
personnel supporting the joint force in a designated operational area” (Kendall, 2011, 
p. 50). OCS is built upon years of implementation, refinement, improvement, and 
innovation. It is one of the most important tools that the United States can take to any 
contingency situation because of its force multiplier effect. This notion has been 
demonstrated through the increased use of contracted support in recent conflicts 
throughout the world in response to the steady decrease of available organic support 
solutions. The lack of integration of OCS into operation plans (OPLANs) has created 
gaps in planning, executing, and measuring the OCS impact, particularly the economic 
impact. Our research focuses on the strategic economic effects that OCS has in 
contingency operations and how to better implement impact evaluation in these 
operations.  
OCS is not a contracting-only function. It requires the full integration of the 
diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of power to achieve 
the desired results. It is important to establish that the military—with its size, power, and 
money—creates its own DIME influences. For the purposes of this project, the focus is 
on the military’s “e” portion of DIME. Said differently, we do not address the federal 
government’s economic instrument of power (the big E), which involves support 
payments, sanctions, and other government-to-government economic instruments. 
Instead, we focus on the military’s economic power (the little e) that is brought to every 
contingency.  
Our research produces a tool for the planning, execution, and measurement of 
OCS and the economic impact it has on shaping operations before, during, and after a 
contingency. While OCS is gaining momentum, the second- and third-order effects of 
OCS need more development at the strategic planning level. Specific areas that need 
improvement include developing metrics to measure OCS effectiveness and identifying 
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when an OCS solution is achieving the desired effects within the contingency’s economic 
environment. The purpose of this project is to (1) assist Operational Contract Support 
Integration Cell (OCSIC) planners in integrating OCS elements into their command’s 
OPLANs, (2) discuss how OCS can be used to shape the battlespace of a contingency, 
and (3) create a framework for commanders and planners to quantify the effectiveness of 
their OCS solutions.  
The primary audiences for our research are the Department of Defense (DOD) 
planning communities that are attempting to integrate OCS into existing OPLANs for 
contingency situations, both domestically and abroad. Secondary audiences include (1) 
other federal agencies, such as the Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA); (2) research organizations; (3) academics, specifically, developmental 
economists; and (4) the industry partners that assist in the deployment of military forces.  
Planners are vital to the long-term sustainability and success of any military 
operation. Planners must be flexible in their preparation understanding large scale 
combat, while also appreciating the increased frequency of small scale contingency 
operations and their importance to future operations as seen in this section.  
Today, the strategic calculus behind foreign assistance appears to have 
shifted, encompassing the prevention of state failure, thwarting terrorism, 
and humanitarian imperative. Yet these shifts have yet to lead to any 
comprehensive review of how American development capabilities should 
be structured and how they fit into larger questions of strategy and 
national security. (Patterson & Stangler, 2010, p. 8).  
Planners must understand OCS and the economic impact that OCS has in a number of 
contingency situations—from shaping operations, disaster relief responses, combat 
operations, and even transition operations. The operational communities’ understanding 
of OCS capabilities is vital to demonstrating to commanders how OCS assists in 
achieving desired lines of effort (LOEs). 
Based on our research, we recommend (1) the developed OCS Impact Evaluation 
Tool be disseminated to OCSIC planners to gain feedback for further development, (2) 
senior leaders create/enforce a policy that mandates OCS planning regardless of the 
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existence of an organic capability, and (3) trained economists with regional and subject 
expertise are placed on OCSIC planning staffs to assist in OCS planning, execution, and 
measurement of OCS solutions. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Chapter II presents a review of pertinent OCS 
literature, including the economic impact that OCS can have during contingencies. 
Following the literature review, in Chapter III, we discuss the methods and briefly 
describe the tactics and procedures used to attain the research objectives. In Chapter IV, 
we discuss the OCS Impact Evaluation Tool and apply the tool to two types of 
contingencies. Chapter V provides recommendations and concludes the research.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we briefly discuss the pertinent OCS literature. We begin with an 
overview of the technical components of OCS, and then move to more recent 
developments of OCS. Finally, we discuss the literature on impact evaluation and how it 
could be useful in future contingencies. 
A. WHY DO WE NEED OCS? 
Failure to implement proper OCS principles can create unintended consequences 
in the local economies that may not align with the commander’s LOEs. For example, “On 
March 31, 2004, four men working for Blackwater USA as security guards were 
ambushed by insurgents in Fallujah. They were killed, their bodies burned and mutilated, 
and two were strung up on a bridge over the Euphrates” (Frontline, 2005). A group of 
Marines stationed nearby were tasked with providing stability operations and ensuring 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations occurred within Fallujah and the surrounding area. 
Their mission was to “win the hearts and minds” of the local populace. Frontline (2005) 
reported that “the Marines in charge of the area didn’t know the Blackwater team would 
be traveling that day into the dangerous city of Fallujah, but four days later they were 
ordered to invade the city and find the killers; this was not the original plan they had had 
for quelling the insurgency in the area.” This is an example of a real, unintended 
consequence of using contractors in the area of responsibility (AOR).  
Although the DOD was the primary responder in the Fallujah example, the 
consequences resulting from improper OCS application extended far beyond the military. 
The DOS had to increase “the number of personnel in Iraq assigned to provide oversight, 
but the increase came at the expense of staffing elsewhere—it happened by shifting 
existing oversight personnel from other locations in Iraq” (Dunning, 2010, p. 11). 
Ultimately, this incident damaged the perception of contracted support as well as 
damaged the COIN mission in Afghanistan. This example illustrates the need for OCS 
improvement and demonstrates why reforms should not be limited to just DOD 
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contracting. This is a federal issue that affects many of the largest and farthest-reaching 
federal agencies.  
As a result of costly contingencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, a doctrinal shift 
within the DOD is being directed by both the Pentagon and Congress. The Gansler 
Report calls for acquisition and contracting reform following the gross misuse of 
taxpayer dollars. This abuse can be traced directly to contracting officers’ inexperience 
with basic contracting theory and competency. “Contracting personnel sent into a theater 
of operations need to be highly skilled, adequately trained, and prepared for the 
challenging, fast-paced demands of expeditionary operations” (Gansler, 2007, p. 14). 
Throughout history, contracted solutions have been used during military, 
humanitarian, and natural disaster relief contingencies. Napoleon Bonaparte, for example, 
used contractors to supply his military with much-needed grain during grain shortages in 
the early 1800s (Bourrienne, 2009, p. 304). During the Revolutionary War, “contractors 
were hired as wagon drivers, and suppliers of beef, clothing, weapons, and basic 
engineering services” (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 2015). 
Although the traditional military force has been concerned with large-scale conflicts and 
has drawn on experiences in WWI and WWII, there has been a shift in the way warfare is 
conducted since those wars were fought. Vietnam provided a precursor to the types of 
military conflicts that have become mainstream in today’s battlespace. Violent extremist 
groups like ISIS require a nimbler and more logistically agile force—a requirement the 
current military structure is less familiar with. These changes necessitate a change to the 
way that the DOD is supported by contracted personnel. Ensuring that the large external 
contracts like Logistics Civil Augmentation Program are properly tailored to the size and 
scope of operations is vital to combatting a very flexible enemy.  
B. TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF OCS 
Operational Contract Support attempts to integrate planning, execution and 
measurement of contracted support. Joint OCS doctrine divides OCS into three functions: 
contract support integration (CSI), contracting support (CS), and contractor management 
(CM). The first function, CSI, involves planning for contracted support. CSI ensures that 
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contracted support requirements are seamlessly integrated into the commander’s OPLAN. 
The second function, CS, involves the execution of contracting. This includes the 
awarding and administration of contracts in support of joint operations. The third 
function, CM, involves all the actions necessary to ensure contractors are properly 
managed and sustained within the contingency environment. As shown in Figure 1, each 
function has its own set of distinct characteristics and desired objectives. However, the 
lines separating functions are blurred in virtually all contingency environments, and 
decisions in one function have significant impacts on other functions. 
 
Figure 1.  Operational Contract Support Description and Subordinate Functions. 
Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS; 2014, p. I-3). 
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1. OCS Planning Phases and Structures 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation 
Planning, describe six operation phases: Phase 0 (Shape), Phase 1 (Deter), Phase 2 (Seize 
Initiative), Phase 3 (Dominate), Phase 4 (Stabilize), and Phase 5 (Enable Civil 
Authorities; CJCS, 2014, p. I-11). JP 4-10 incorporates OCS principles into each of the 
operational phases and goes into depth on the roles, responsibilities, and actions required 
of OCS planners. Each combatant command has an OCSIC whose primary purpose is to 
integrate OCS into the OPLANs. Figure 2 summarizes the phases described in JP 3-0 and 
overlays OCS actions that may occur during each phase.  
 
Figure 2.  Notional Operational Contract Support Actions by Phase of Operation. 
Source: CJCS (2014, p. I-12). 
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Phase 0 is particularly important; the objective of this phase is to “dissuade or 
deter adversaries, develop relationships with, and assure multinational partners, as well as 
to set conditions for the successful execution of contingency plans and are generally 
conducted through security cooperation activities” (CJCS, 2014, p. I-11). Stated 
differently, the goal of Phase 0 is to prevent the need to deploy kinetic resources to a 
given contingency. The use of OCS in Phase 0 can be particularly powerful. During 
Phase 0, access to areas can be acquired by using contracts to build up a target area—
specifically, establishing business relationships and prepositioning contracted support.  
JP 4-10 formalizes different contracting structures based on the scope, size, and 
level of complexity of the contingency operation. The three major contract support 
structures, listed from least complex to most complex, are as follows: Lead Service for 
Contracting Coordination (LSCC), Lead Service for Contracting (LSC), and Joint Theater 
Support Contracting Command (JTSCC). Figure 3 provides a brief overview of these 
structures. 
 
Figure 3.  Lead Contracting Activity Primary Tasks and Phasing Model. Source: 
CJCS (2014, p. IV-1). 
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Discussions with various boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups 
(B2C2WGs) during the CSI process helps commanders choose a structure that is tailored 
to the contingency. Organizations like the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 
(JCASO) that operates out of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Joint 
Requirements Review Board (JRRB), and the Combatant Commander Logistics 
Procurement Support Board (CLPSB) facilitate the execution of OCS depending on the 
structure chosen for a given contingency. The goal of these working groups and boards is 
to create a standard operating site picture and a set of standard operating procedures that 
all services can understand and be ready to implement. Finally, even after a commander 
chooses a structure, it may change (i.e., increase or reduce in complexity) to fit the 
developing contingency. 
2. OCS Integration in OPLANs 
The GAO (2011) states “an operational plan describes how the DOD will respond 
to a potential event that might require the use of military force” (p. 7). The planning 
process separated OPLANs into four categories, with Level 1 plans containing little detail 
and Level 4 plans containing detailed operational information. At the highest levels of 
planning, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) “directs OCS planning for all plan 
levels and types to include commanders’ estimate, base plan, concept plan (CONPLAN), 
OPLAN, and campaign plan” (CJCS, 2014, p. III-8). To facilitate this planning, JP 4-10 
establishes multiple planning and integration working groups, policies, and procedures. 
The OCSIC is a vital group whose purpose is to “perform phase 0/steady-state contract 
support integration functions and to provide oversight of any subordinate joint force 
command OCSIC (when formed)” (CJCS, 2014, p. III-3). Figure 4 provides a list of the 
primary tasks that the OCSIC is required to perform.  
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Figure 4.  Common Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks. 
Source: CJCS (2014, p. D-4). 
The DOD has declared, with the release of JP 4-10, that OCS must be properly 
planned for as it will have a major role in future contingency operations. Annex W is the 
contracting annex to the OPLAN and is mandatory to account for all the contracted 
support required throughout all phases of the operation. Many current OPLANS contain 
Annex Ws, but fall short of adequately describing how a commander can use contracted 
support to for their LOEs. In many cases, current Annex Ws describe the procedures to 
stand up LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC structures but fail to provide traceable OCS solutions 
that relate to a commander’s LOEs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
asserts, “Most draft Annex Ws developed to date restate broad language from existing 
DOD guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces but included few 
details on the type of contractors needed to execute a given plan” (GAO, 2010, p. 4). 
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To enhance the effectiveness of the Annex W, it is imperative that planners are trained to 
link OCS solutions to the commander’s objectives. 
Planners encounter many issues preparing Annex Ws, a significant issue being the 
lack of sufficient detail provided in the OPLANs. This includes the number of personnel 
supported, the duration of the contingency, the area’s economic maturity, and the 
commander’s intent. Describing the contracted support required in an unknown 
contingency is a very complex and difficult process. Planners must assess each 
contingency’s unique prevailing economic, business, and cultural differences. This 
necessary information is not completely known prior to conflicts, but close interaction 
between the multifunctional planning staffs assists OCS planners in identifying 
requirements, force size, resources required, and other necessary OCS planning 
information. Integrating OCS into OPLANs provides value by ensuring contracted 
solutions align with the commander’s intent, thus potentially shrinking operational 
timelines.  
C. DEVELOPMENT OF OCS 
The U.S. military is undergoing a significant transformation. Throughout its 
history, the DOD has moved to an all-volunteer force, Congress has imposed troop 
constraints, and resources are becoming increasingly scarce. Many of the support 
functions are evolving from organic to inorganic or contracted support solutions in order 
to maintain mission essential capability. Additionally, the level of contracted support is 
increasing in complexity, moving from basic transportation services to complex security 
contracts. The degree of contractors’ integration into the traditional military force is also 
increasing, especially in recent operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Previously, military commanders relied on forms of logistical contract support (e.g., 
supply of grain, weapons, armor, etc.) to support their troops. In 2017, operational 
communities rely on major external contracted solutions, like the U.S. Army’s Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program, to provide everything from dining facility services and 
laundry services to aircraft and vehicle refueling. These more complex contracts provide 
a significant force multiplier capability to commanders but come with both a major price 
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tag and the added complexity of integrating contractors into military operating locations. 
This integration requires that the commanders plan for contractor deployment, 
sustainment, and redeployment in almost the exact same way they plan for their troops. 
Figure 5 shows the increased complexity of and U.S. reliance on contracted support from 
the American Revolution to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF). It also depicts the decreasing ratio of service member to contracted 
support, with the ratio eventually settling at 1:1 during OEF and OIF. The GAO asserts,  
At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors 
exceeded the number of military personnel, and a similar situation is 
occurring in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. According to the 
DOD, in 2012, the number of contracted in Afghanistan exceeded 109,000 
compared to the approximately 84,200 military personnel present at that 
same time. (GAO, 2013, p. 1) 
 
Figure 5.  Evolving Participation of Contractors in the U.S. Military. 
Adapted from DPAP (2015). 
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The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect the growth of violent extremist 
groups. A major weapon against violent extremist groups and other non-state actors is the 
use of COIN operations, which, in part, rely on the strategic execution of money. In 
COIN operations, money is used for economic stimulation, sustainable job creation, and 
the increase of entrepreneurial ventures. Schramm (2010) states, 
There is a proven model for just such economic growth right in front of 
U.S. policymakers’ eyes: the entrepreneurial model practiced in the United 
States and elsewhere. … Washington’s recent engagements have made it 
appreciate that post-conflict economic reconstruction must become a core 
competence of the U.S. military. (pp. 89–90) 
Clearly, there is a strategic use of funds to provide commanders with non-kinetic options 
to affect the COIN lines of effort. 
Personnel must employ effective measurement tools to accurately demonstrate 
that OCS solutions are executing funds in accordance with commanders’ strategic goals. 
In addition, personnel must create methods of collection in order to provide timely, 
accurate, and useful information to implement effective impact evaluation. The challenge 
lies in identifying the economic indicators that the OCS solution is attempting to shape, 
and in determining how to measure and collect such information. Further, parsing out 
OCS-related effects from effects that happen by chance (i.e., unplanned, non-OCS-related 
effects) is difficult.  
Future U.S. military operations will be a mix of contingencies ranging from 
traditional military conflict to humanitarian assistance. OCS concepts are not tied to any 
particular type of military operation, rather, they are tailorable to meet the type, scale, 
location, and complexity of any military operation, kinetic or non-kinetic. The following 
excerpt from a Kauffman Foundation Research Series report highlights the tension 
between kinetic military action and non-kinetic stability operations: 
In an ideal world, economic development in post-conflict situations lies 
within the purview of civilian organizations such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the Department of State. This “ideal world” 
relies on the assumption that war and peace are discrete conditions, 
a paradigm that looks increasingly anachronistic. Instead, there is a 
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continuum of conflict which may be dramatically different from one part 
of a country to another. This compounds the problem of “turning over” the 
economic development functions to a civilian agency. (Patterson & 
Stangler, 2010, pp. 8–9) 
For OCS effects to be sustained, the U.S. military must team with pertinent other 
governmental agencies (OGAs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that also 
have a vested interest in the coordinated use of money to affect economic development in 
developing regions. Roles and responsibilities for economic development continue to 
remain points of contention. The military’s primary role is to serve and protect U.S. 
interests at home and abroad. This mission has economic effects, which—if not properly 
thought through or accounted for in planning phases—can have significant consequences 
as seen with the massive expenditures in OEF and OIF.  
D. OCS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
While the idea of OCS has been around for hundreds of years, albeit by different 
names, the idea of “money as a weapon system” (MAAWS)—or as it is known now, 
“integrated money shaping operations” (IMSO)—became an important weapon during 
OEF and OIF. General Petraeus, then a major general in charge of the 101st Airborne 
Division Air Assault, indicated during OIF and OEF, “Money is my most important 
ammunition in this war” (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2009, p. 1). Effectively and 
strategically using money is essential to carrying out military operations.  
In today’s DOD military engagements, the lines between economic development 
and military combat operations are blurred. Economics is a part of the political, military, 
economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time 
(PMESII-PT) analysis that is usually left to the agencies primarily involved with stability 
operations. There is an ongoing debate over who is responsible for economic 
development within disaster ridden states. It is the job of organizations such as the 
USAID, the DOS, United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and many other NGOs, to 
stabilize and rebuild contingency areas. As an institution, the military’s primary mission 
is not economic development; however, the amount of economic power the military 
wields makes it one important entity in the overall cooperative for economic 
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development, and the military’s post-conflict missions rely heavily on achieving 
economic stability.  
Understanding the use of money, its effect on the local economy, and the impact 
of economic growth for a contingency has dramatic impacts on the successful and 
sustainable transition from Phase IV, Stabilize, to Phase V, Enable Civil Authorities. 
Since WWII, the U.S. military has found itself playing a much larger role in nation 
building, infrastructure repair, economic growth, and winning the hearts and minds of the 
local populace. “It is a well-accepted adage that military success without strategic success 
is not success, and sustainable peace after conflict has been a much more elusive goal 
than military victory over the past two decades” (Patterson & Stangler, 2010, p. 6).  
Recently, funds execution has failed to produce sustainable economic activity for 
the local populace. Patterson & Stangler (2010) comment, “In a post-conflict setting, 
money can create as many problems as it can solve. Overreliance on grants and aid 
actually creates disincentives for entrepreneurship” (p. 12). Instead of tactical spending, 
the Kaufmann Institute recommends a more strategic execution of funds “to help the 
local population’s small businesses get over the barriers of entry and to create more small 
businesses that will promote economic growth” (Patterson & Stangler, 2010, p. 12). Of 
course, not all money can be utilized strategically.  
1. Expeditionary Economics  
Expeditionary economics is a relatively new subset of economics that targets 
economic reconstruction in post-conflict or post-disaster nations (Patterson & Stangler, 
2010, p. 7). The main premise of Expeditionary Economics is that external state actors 
focus on revitalizing free-market capitalism in war-torn or disaster-struck economies. 
Schramm (2010, p. 93) asserts that these actors should attempt to set up the country in 
such a manner that circumstances enable the right variety of people and ideas to flourish 
so as to gain long-term economic growth and stability.  
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2. Economic Impact Evaluation 
In this section, we cite Impact Evaluation in Practice by Gertler, Martinez, 
Premand, Rawlings, and Vermeersch (2011) a great deal as we walk through the steps of 
designing an impact evaluation. Impact evaluations assess how a planned program or 
action has or has not changed an outcome. Conducting this analysis properly includes 
“ensuring proper accountability of inputs, outputs and results or accurately identifying the 
causal relationship” (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 4). This assists planners and commanders to 
identify which actions and programs are directly or indirectly contributing to mission 




Figure 6.   Roadmap for Implementing an Impact Evaluation. Source: 
Gertler et al. (2011, p. 141). 
Gertler et al. (2011) define monitoring as “a continuous process that tracks what is 
happening within a program and use the data collected to inform program implementation 
and day-to-day management and decisions” (p. 7). This takes collected outcomes and 
measures them against the ultimate objectives of the program or policy. In the case of 
OCS, it takes the measures of performance (MOPs) of the contracted solution and 
assesses the degree of effectiveness with the measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  
Evaluations are discrete, timed assessments during certain periods of the program 
that measure specific metrics against baseline data. Gertler et al. (2011) state that 
evaluations should examine the outcomes and try to assess whether or not an intervention 
is making a difference (p. 7). This type of analysis is especially important with military 
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conflicts and the application of OCS. The “fog and friction” of war makes it difficult to 
make decisions with all the information necessary so decision makers must facilitate 
constant evaluation with how current actions are meeting desired outcomes. The goal of 
impact evaluation is to look for any changes in the outcome that can be tied directly to 
the planned intervention. In its most basic form, impact evaluation will reveal whether, “a 
given program [was] effective compared to the absence of the program” (Gertler et al., 
2011, p. 8) and, specifically related to OCS, whether a specific OCS solution is effective 
compared to the solution not being implemented. A more complex impact evaluation can 
measure the differential effectiveness of two different programs to see which one is more 
effective in achieving program or mission objectives, relative to no program.  
Impact evaluation can be expensive for an organization to implement, therefore, 
analysis of whether a program requires impact evaluation must be considered before 
implementation. The program’s potential benefits must outweigh the estimated costs, and 
implementation can leverage lessons learned from previous evaluations. In short, factors 
to be considered are whether or not a program is innovative, replicable, strategically 
relevant, untested, and potentially influential (Gertler et al., 2011, pp. 10–11). Impact 
evaluations are difficult even in a controlled environment. These evaluations are even 
more complicated in the constantly shifting environment in which the military typically 
operates. While the need for impact evaluation can be easily justified in terms of number 
of lives saved, dollars saved, or campaign days saved, the complexity of the analytical 
environment is a major concern.  
Gertler et al. (2011) assert that there are two main categories of impact 
evaluations. The first is prospective evaluations, which are designed in sync with the 
program development and formed into the program implementation. The second type of 
impact evaluation is retrospective evaluations, which “assess program impact after the 
program has been implemented, generating treatment and comparison groups ex-post” 
(p. 13). Prospective impact evaluations usually result in stronger and more reliable 
solutions because of the development of proper baseline data. OCS planning groups are 
working on establishing these baselines for prospective contingency areas. Planners could 
leverage the expertise of institutions like the World Bank and the IMF to assist in 
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gathering this baseline data. The authors also state that with prospective evaluations, 
more comprehensive definitions of measurement success are established and treatment 
and comparison groups are established before the implementation of the program, which 
can validate counterfactuals (p. 13). Retrospective evaluations provide necessary 
information to commanders to make data-driven decisions when the proper statistics are 
monitored and evaluated correctly.  
As Patterson and Stangler (2010) state, “After nearly ten years at war, the United 
States still lacks any real evidence of the impact of its spending in most economic 
sectors” (p. 13). Impact evaluation provides results for measuring program effectiveness 
and whether these results have external validity. That is, can these results be replicated 
for populations other than those that were initially involved in the study? If we want to 
extrapolate the results of an impact analysis to other settings, the analysis should not be 
performed in a vacuum; considerations for external factors must always be examined 
(Gertler et al., 2011, p. 16).  
3. Results Chain, MOPs, and MOEs 
Gertler et al. (2011) state that the theories of change are the “description of how 
an intervention is supposed to deliver the desired results” (p. 22). The Results Chain 
walks users through the logical progression of how to get their desired results. This is 
best started at the origin of the program, where all stakeholders can form a collective 
understanding of the program’s functionality and its goals, as well as any key 
assumptions. The results chain is a model employed to monitor impact. “A results chain 
sets out a logical, plausible outline of how a sequence of inputs, activities, and outputs for 
which a project is directly responsible interacts with behavior to establish pathways 
through which impacts are achieved” (Gertler et al., 2011, pp. 23–24). The fundamental 
features of a results chain are inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and final outcomes (or 
impact; see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.   Results Chain. Source: Gertler et al. (2011, p. 25). 
After the results chain is adequately outlined, users formulate hypotheses for 
evaluation. The hypotheses capture the desired effects gained from the program’s 
implementation. These evaluation hypotheses are similar to the desired end states in 
military planning doctrine, which planners use to develop MOEs. The performance 
indicators along the results chain need to be established for “monitoring program 
implementation and to evaluate results” (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 27). These indicators 
should be specific, measurable, attributable, realistic, and targeted (SMART). 
Performance indicators are created for final outcome stages as well as along the results 
chain. Gertler et al. (2011) specify, “Without these indicators all along the results chain, 
the impact evaluation will produce only a ‘black box’ that identifies whether or not the 
predicted results materialized; it will not be able to explain why that was the case” 
(pp. 27–28). The performance indicators are most like the measures of performance 
(MOPs) in military planning doctrine. Performance indicators are monitored throughout 
the course of the proposed OCS solutions’ result chain to ensure the solution is on the 
correct path. 
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Figure 8 summarizes the MOP, MOE, and Overall Impact analysis steps provided 
by the IMSO, and lists some generic questions that a planner or commander should be 
asking throughout an operation. 
 
Figure 8.  MOP/MOE/Overall Impact Analysis. Adapted from 
Air Land Seas Application Center (2013, p. 37). 
The military consistently uses MOP and MOE to assess the effectiveness of its 
operations. OCS has yet to successfully adopt this method of assessment, and thus has 
had a difficult time in demonstrating the effectiveness of OCS solutions. This research 
aims to reverse that trend by helping planners understand potential OCS-related measures 
of performance and effectiveness. “Metrics and performance measures should be built 
into U.S. military information collection plans pre- and post-conflict” (Patterson & 
Stangler, 2010, p. 13). There is not a one-size-fits-all model because each contingency 
has unique characteristics that planners must address and measure during the operation. 
Schramm asserts, “International development researchers have often been perplexed by 
the fact that a program that produces good results in one country may not work in 
another. They should not be: every situation is different; formulaic approaches cannot 
work” (Schramm, 2010, p. 97). This issue of external validity means policymakers must 
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look at the context of each location and situation. Although lessons learned are applicable 
for evaluations, there is no universal plan that will work in every scenario.  
The Joint Staff (2016) define an MOP as a “criterion used to assess friendly 
actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment” (p. 149). Examples include 
dollars spent in a given region, number of contracts awards to local small businesses, and 
number of local personnel hired by contracts, among others. MOE is defined as “criterion 
used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or Operational Environment that 
are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or 
creation of an effect” (Joint Staff, 2016, p. 149). Thus, MOEs, as they relate to this 
research project, assess the degree to which an OCS solution’s outcome is meeting the 
commander’s LOE.  
4. Causal Effect 
Properly and accurately tracking the impact of a program is the same as tracking 
the causal effect of that program. Impact evaluation provides a means for “establishing 
causality by empirically establishing to what extent a particular program … contributed 
to the change in an outcome” (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 34). In the context of OCS, we are 
trying to empirically determine that the OCS solution implemented contributed to the 
resultant change in the operational environment. However, this presents a fundamental 
problem. The counterfactual problem is defined by Gertler et al. (2011) as the fact that a 
“person cannot be observed simultaneously in two different states” (p. 35). Causality 
conclusion compels the dismissal of other factors that could have affected the outcome to 
justify the impact of the program that was implemented. Planners must examine and 
offset potential counterfactuals, as this is vital for decision makers trying to decide 
whether to continue or deviate from a particular OCS solution. The most effective 
method to estimate or nullify counterfactuals is to establish valid comparison and 
treatment groups. Patterson and Stangler (2010) contend that “counterfactual analyses 
could be enormously useful to the military and civilian development apparatus in 
preparing for future contingencies and making adjustments” (p. 15). Having valid 
comparison groups means the groups “will have the same characteristics as the group of 
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participants in the program … except for the fact that the units in the comparison group 
did not benefit from the program” (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 38). This comparison group, 
while useful in a controlled or sustainment environment, is difficult to execute during 
kinetic operations. It is important not to change the original intent of the intervention to 
suit the strategy of the evaluation. The evaluation must be designed to best suit the type 
of evaluation that is being implemented.  
Proper evaluations require dynamic relationships between policy makers and the 
evaluators. Agencies have the option to contract out the evaluation function in whole or 
partially. By having an external party conduct the evaluation, the evaluation maintains 
objectivity and credibility. Impact evaluation teams should always include certain 
members. Gertler et al. (2011) suggest the inclusion of an evaluation manager, sampling 
expert, person responsible for designing data collection instruments and accompanying 
manuals and codebooks, field work team, data managers and processors, and data and 
policy analysts (pp. 156–157). The military must make up a part of this team as Patterson 
and Stanger indicate, “Regardless of whether or not the military should be responsible for 
building economies, the military will be a leading arm of the United States in post-
conflict societies for an extended period of time” (Patterson & Stangler, 2010, p. 10). The 
military is taking ownership of this responsibility and is assessing how to evaluate the 
impact of OCS operations—whether the competency should be developed organically or 
should be contracted out to external organizations.  
Gertler asserts, “Timing of an evaluation must also take into account when certain 
information is need to inform decision making and must synchronize evaluation and data 
collection activities to key decision-making points” (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 160). Baseline 
data is gathered at the onset of the evaluation, and many factors determine when follow-
up data should be gathered. The program cycle, expected time needed for the program to 
affect outcomes, and policy-making cycles should all be considered when looking at 
timing of evaluations. 
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E. COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF DATA 
Measurement of an implemented OCS solution requires accurate and relevant 
information, the expertise to analyze it, and a method by which to disseminate the results. 
Appendix G of JP 4-10 provides the current process of collection, analysis, and 
dissemination, which can be seen in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9.  Analysis of the Operational Contract Support Aspects of the 
Operational Environment Process. Source: CJCS (2014, p. G-4). 
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The DOD method for baseline and comparison data collection is similar to the 
methods introduced by Gertler et al. (2011). Gertler et al.’s primary means of collecting 
the baseline data on a population is through surveys or randomized assignment. This is 
where OCS and traditional impact evaluation may not align effectively. In the military, it 
is unethical and inefficient to deny a person or business entry into a program for the 
purposes of impact evaluation. Also, the fast-paced nature of many contingency 
situations gives little time for in-depth data collection and analysis in the moment without 
proper personnel and processes in place. The DOD does not have an economist specialty 
code and as such relies on expertise from other federal agencies, academic institutions, 
think tanks, or other NGOs. One of the most important changes in the OCS planning 
process is the addition of, or increased use of, economists in the OCSIC. These experts 
can identify the correct information, request specific data from troops on the ground, 
analyze it, and disseminate it to the appropriate decision makers.  
Quality data is vital to the assessment of the impact: “Data on outcome indicators 
that the program indirectly affects or indicators capturing unintended program impact 
will maximize the value of the information that the impact evaluation generates” (Gertler 
et al., 2011, p. 171). Personnel must collect quality baseline data for proper monitoring of 
intermediate and final outcomes. Collecting a broad range of data on characteristics of the 
treatment and comparison groups, administrative, and exogenous factors makes it 
possible to conduct multiple types of evaluations, further validating the program that is 
being evaluated. Existing data may be available for an evaluation and could greatly 
reduce the cost of the evaluation (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 173). If existing data is available, 
the evaluator still needs to ensure the data sets are large enough to expose changes. Also, 
ensure data exists for both the treatment and comparison group populations. The scope 
and frequency of the data sets must also be considered (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 174). 
However, if existing administrative data is not available or satisfactory for the evaluation, 
Gertler et al. (2011) assert that follow-up survey data will have to be collected; “Power 
calculations provide an indication of the smallest sample (and lowest budget) with which 
it is possible to measure the impact of the program” (p. 176). When evaluators take a 
larger sample from the target population we get a more accurate assessment for the 
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evaluation; however, this comes with a larger cost. If evaluators take too small of a 
sample, we risk getting an invalid evaluation. Type 1 and type 2 errors are two types of 
error experienced when equating the average results for the treatment and comparison 
groups. “A type 1 error is made when an evaluation concludes that a program has had 
impact, when it reality it had no impact” (Gertler et al., 2011, p. 179). A type 2 error 
“occurs when an evaluation concludes that the program has had no impact, when in fact it 
has had an impact” (p. 176). These types of errors are minimized through parameters 
called confidence intervals.  
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III. THE OCS IMPACT EVALUATION TOOL 
This research integrates OCS and impact evaluation and introduces the OCS 
Impact Evaluation Tool, which focuses planners on the planning, execution, and 
measurement of OCS while integrating the steps of the Impact Evaluation Results Chain. 
The tool arms planners with the right questions to ask to address potential desired and 
undesired economic impacts of military spending. Figure 10 presents the OCS Impact 
Evaluation Tool. We discuss the components of the tool in the following sections.  
 
Figure 10.  OCS Impact Evaluation Tool  
To demonstrate how a planner might use the OCS Impact Evaluation Tool, we 
evaluate two contingencies using the tool that are representative of contingencies faced 
by the DOD in recent years. The first contingency is a humanitarian aid/disaster relief 
(HA/DR) scenario involving a hurricane loosely based on Hurricane Katrina. The second 
example is a traditional military conflict focused on creating OCS solutions in an 
unfamiliar culture with the potential for a counterinsurgency environment. We identify 
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some considerations when collecting information for the planning phase of the OCS 
Impact Evaluation Tool. This is the first step to identifying LOEs, determining 
commander’s intent (if not expressly stated), using a PMESII-PT analysis to assess the 
operational environment, and developing inputs as a result of the analysis. Inputs are the 
various resources and capabilities that are available to commanders as they begin to 
execute a program or operation. These inputs set the stage for the intervention and allows 
the planners to collect any baseline data that they will later compare to outputs.   
A. CONTINGENCY IDENTIFICATION 
The first step of the contingency planning process is to identify the type of 
contingency environment military forces might enter. The traditional military conflict 
requires the largest military footprint in terms of manpower and resources and is the most 
complex contingency environment that military forces encounter. Figure 11 depicts the 
two dominant types of warfare: conventional and non-conventional (asymmetric) 
warfare.  
 
Figure 11.  Conventional versus Unconventional Warfare. Adapted from 
Larson, Eaton, Nichiporuk, and Szayna (2008). 
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These two types of warfare represent the most likely and most dangerous 
scenarios for military forces. Understanding the type of enemy that the military is likely 
to encounter, the degree of economic activity in the region, and the types of tactics likely 
to be employed by the enemy provides planners with the tools they need to shape and 
influence the battlespace using OCS solutions. Traditional military conflicts leave 
bystanders fleeing for their safety, creating large-scale displacement of non-combatant 
refugees. Humanitarian assistance is not limited to outcomes from traditional military 
conflict; it also becomes a need following natural disasters, man-made contingencies like 
nuclear power plant failure, or widespread poverty and low standards of living. Natural 
disasters occur every year, in many different ways, all around the world and include 
hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, and so forth. The degree of disaster can range 
from tsunamis in the Philippines to hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico. In fact, Hurricane 
Katrina is a prime example of how the lack of OCS planning and implementation led to 
prolonged economic stagnation and recovery efforts. The three types of contingencies 
described above do not represent the full range of contingencies possible, but they are 
familiar to military planners. Each type of contingency requires different planning 
considerations, and, potentially, different OCS solutions. 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
The military is one instrument of national power, and due to the amount of 
resources the U.S. military wields, it also brings with it its own massive economic 
influence (little e). Identification of the type of economy, as well as the motives, 
incentives, and driving economic engines of the contingency environment ensure the 
correct application of OCS solutions. Each contingency environment experiences a 
different level of economic maturity, ranging from a nuclear mishap in a mature economy 
like Japan to an Ebola outbreak in a far less mature economy in Western Africa. OCS 
solutions should be tailored to the economic maturity of the region. Three top-level 
descriptions of economic maturity are (1) under-developed, (2) nationally developed, and 
(3) globally developed.  
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Under-developed economies are typically localized, isolated, and reliant on labor-
intensive economic activities. Agriculture tends to be the dominant economic driver in 
under-developed countries. The Kauffman Foundation creates an example in which the 
driving economic engine in a region is agriculture, specifically localized farming. 
According to their example, if OCS is applied to create jobs for building infrastructure or 
cleaning streets, personnel are pulled off the farms for employment. This yields a short-
term win for economic growth and meets military objectives like removing military-aged 
men from the influence of violent extremist groups by offering employment 
opportunities. However, this type of work relies on the presence of military personnel in 
the region—sustained presence means sustained need for contracted support, which 
means sustained employment. However, once the military leaves, so do the 
contracts/jobs, and then the employees return to the farms. However, because of their 
absence, the farms are now underproductive, and the overall result is lower economic 
output for the region. Clearly, the intention to provide jobs in the region is good (i.e., to 
lower unemployment and improve quality of life, and to stave off influence from violent 
extremist groups); however, the overall effect counters the economic stability of the 
region. The goal is to apply OCS solutions in ways that produce sustainable, long-term 
economic improvements for contingency environments.  
A developed (national) economy consists of connected regional or tribal 
economies that trade and interact at the national level. In many cases, this type of 
economy is developed and strong, but has not become a global player, or may not interact 
effectively in the global market. Such economies have more complex business sectors, 
like banking or finance, and are treated differently than the under-developed agricultural-
based economy. A developed (global) economy is one that interacts in the global market. 
The economies of the United States, Japan, European Union member states, and China 
are all examples of developed (global) economies. These types of economies are already 
very interactive with other developed nations and have adequate infrastructure, social 
order, and baseline economic data that enhance the effects of OCS solutions.  
Regardless of the economic maturity of a contingency environment, every 
economy or culture has different values, motives, and incentives. Understanding these 
 33 
drivers helps derive appropriate OCS solutions. The use of OCS requires a rich 
understanding of the needs and motivations of the targeted demographic sectors. For 
example, in rural Afghanistan, the prime motivation might be to bring money home to 
support the family. In this instance, any type of sustainable employment brings about 
both positive economic growth and successful COIN operations. However, in a culture 
like Japan that values education and business, the rebuilding of schools and business 
mentorship after WWII played to Japanese economic motives and cultural values. 
Understanding the economic drivers for a target segment and what motivates them assists 
planners in providing tailored OCS support to achieve the commander’s strategic 
objectives.  
Incentives come in many forms: money, jobs, protection, and so forth. Impacting 
change in a local population and operating a successful initiative relies on understanding 
incentives. It is important to note that what incentivizes Western civilizations may not 
incentivize members of other cultures. Planners need to consult with the local populace 
and learn what assets would be most useful to them: “Poor and conflict laden countries 
need more education and skill training, but they also need an economic context where 
they can realize the economic returns from improved human capital” (Patterson & 
Stangler, 2010, p. 11). Understanding what incentivizes a person, culture, or nation 
assists the planner in providing the correct OCS recommendations to commanders and 
amplify the effects of those OCS solutions.  
C. CONSIDERATIONS OF ACTION 
Planners look at both the desired effect of the OCS solution and the potential 
second- and third-order effects. Planners must consider the effects that are outside the 
military and economic domains. In addition, even though the intended effects occur, there 
may be unintended consequences that were not anticipated that can negatively impact the 
commander’s LOE even more than the intended positive effect may help. This is why 
MOEs are vital to OPLANs and corresponding annexes—at the first sign of an 
unintended negative consequence, the plan is reevaluated and a determination is made to 
continue or discontinue an OCS solution. The medical adage is appropriate here: First, do 
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no harm. To grasp a better idea of the micro-level environment that planners are going to 
operate in, they conduct an analysis of the operational environment. 
Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical 
environment, and time (PMESII-PT) analysis plays a role in every professional military 
analysis of the operational environment and is a driving force for planners’ decision 
making. The OCS Impact Evaluation Tool assists planners in asking what impacts the 
potential OCS solution has on the “E” and “S” domains and whether or not those effects 
are desirable. Figure 12 presents a brief description of the PMESII-PT categories. 
 
Figure 12.  PMESII-PT Variables. Source: Department of the Army 
(2013, p. 2-12). 
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Planners must carefully consider each of these variables to determine how they 
affect the commander’s desired end state and the overall impact to the operational 
environment. Figure 13 depicts the sub-variables to consider in order to enhance 
understanding of the driving components of each PMESII-PT variable.  
 
Figure 13.  PMESII-PT Sub-variables. Source: Department of the Army 
(2013, p. 2-13). 
Aside from the operational environment analysis, there is an intent behind each 
purchase from the tactical level of spend to the strategic level of spend. For the most part, 
in the tactical level of spend, the intended consequences are identified pretty easily. Did 
the troops get their gear? Did the maintenance on the flight line get accomplished? At the 
strategic level, intended consequences are harder to assess. Did the country-wide 
indefinite delivery–indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract enhance trucking capability in Iraq 
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while increasing relations with tribal leaders? How much did the government save on this 
IDIQ contract, and to what degree were logistics improved as a result? What is even more 
difficult than trying to assess the intended consequences of strategic spend is trying to 
predict the potential unintended consequences of a proposed contracted solution.  
While the host nation trucking contract in Iraq was a great success, the same 
model proved to be an utter failure in Afghanistan. What was not accounted for were the 
cultural differences in Afghanistan and the way business occurred in the tribal regions. 
Since it is customary in Afghanistan to pay bribes to warlords to use their road networks, 
the U.S. military, through their host nation trucking contract, indirectly funded warlords 
and Taliban militants. “The [Host Nation Trucking] HNT contractors and their trucking 
subcontractors pay tens of millions of dollars annually to local warlords across 
Afghanistan in exchange for ‘protection’ for HNT supply convoys to support U.S. 
troops” (Tierney, 2010, p. 29). This proved to be a costly, unintended consequence that 
may have been avoided if cultural practices had been taken into consideration through the 
proper use of OCS and MOEs, which should have been in place to measure whether the 
desired effect was occurring.  
OCS planners work to strike a balance between assisting commanders in meeting 
their short-term objectives and achieving sustainable long-term outcomes. The company 
commander’s mission is tactical: stabilize the city. The division commander’s mission is 
strategic: stabilize the country. A good planner can work OCS solutions such that a 
commander achieves their short-term objective while also achieving, or at least not 
hurting, their ability to achieve long-term objectives.  
Is the OCS solution self-sustainable or does the action rely on the presence of 
U.S. or coalition personnel for the success or continued sustainment of the activity? 
Executing a contract for street sweeping meets a short-term objective of employing 
military-aged men. However, it does not meet the commander’s long term objective of 
creating sustainable growth in the economy. In this case, the commander achieves short-
term success, potentially at the expense of prolonging sustained economic growth in the 
region. Instead of targeting the business activities that required U.S. or coalition presence 
and money for success, OCS solutions must focus on the development of small 
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businesses, entrepreneurial spirit, and removal of barriers to marketplace entry with an 
emphasis on the natural resources and competencies of the state. Such solutions create a 
much more sustainable economic environment that is not entirely dependent on the flow 
of foreign funds for success. It is important to note that long-term economic growth may 
not be a long-term objective for commanders and short-term success may be of more vital 
or strategic importance. The tool assists planners in asking the pertinent questions in 
regards to a commander’s short-term or long-term objectives.  
D. EXECUTION 
During the execution phase of the OCS Impact Evaluation Tool, the planner, 
given the inputs from the planning phase, suggests a specific OCS solution and discusses 
the relevant components of the decision. This section addresses the what, when, who, 
how, where, and why (the objective) of the specific OCS solution.  
Planners begin the execution phase by identifying an OCS solution that meets the 
commander’s objectives. This specific OCS solution can be in the form of a new policy, 
contracted solution, coordination of funding with other agencies like USAID, or some 
combination of these possibilities. The OCS solution ties into the Impact Evaluation 
Results Chain “Activities” segment. After analyzing the input information, the planners 
can create a targeted OCS solution. This solution is specific and unique to the 
LOE/commander’s intent that it is addressing.  
After the planner selects an OCS solution, they identify the optimal timing for 
implementation of the solution. This could be immediate in the case of natural disasters 
or more long term in the case of a drawn-out military conflict. For example, fighting 
typically occurs with a seasonal trend, that is, less fighting occurs in the extreme 
temperature months of the year. Therefore, when trying to implement a trucking contract, 
implementation may be most optimal during periods of lower fighting. This provides a 
better opportunity for a smooth implementation and the ability to obtain better data for 
measurement. Timing-based considerations are taken into account to provide a more 
effective OCS solution.  
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Once the timing is identified, planners capture all relevant stakeholders impacted 
by the execution of the OCS solution. Stakeholders include those that are planning 
operations; those authorizing, obligating, and expending funds; those that are impacted 
by the funds (troops, local populace, refugees, etc.); and any others who experience a 
positive or negative effect from the OCS solution. Once identified, planners agree to the 
stakeholder’s roles and responsibilities during the OCS solution. For example, the 
operations groups is responsible for requirements identification, the contracting squadron 
for contract execution, and the tactical military units on patrol for the data collection.  
Once the timing and stakeholders are identified, planners need to assess how the 
OCS solution will be executed. The OCS solution can be a new policy (think Afghan-
First), a new contract, or some other contracted solution. An OCS solution in itself 
provides the “what” to a commander, and the “how” incorporates the resources that a 
commander requires, something that is scarce in a contingency environment.  
Understanding where to implement an OCS solution is paramount to the potential 
success of the solution. Knowing where to strategically execute funds means faster 
economic recovery in a natural disaster incident or faster stability or reconstruction 
efforts in the event of a military conflict. The famous real estate saying of “location, 
location, location” cannot be any more accurate when discussing where to implement an 
OCS solution. Hurricane Katrina is a prime example of how OCS execution in certain 
locations have positive or negative effects on an affected area. Hurricane Katrina 
displayed distinct rings of devastation. The most significant damage occurred in the 
devastation ring located in and around New Orleans. In the devastation ring, businesses 
were rendered inoperable and most economic activity ceased to produce outputs. The 
threat ring is the ring that immediately surrounds the devastation ring. While impacted 
and damaged, businesses were still operational and provided economic output. Outside 
the threat ring were the marginally and unaffected rings. This is where the damage was 
marginal and economic output dropped a little or remained somewhat constant.  
It is important to know where businesses are in an operation, and where 
commanders receive the most economic stimulation per dollar spent. Funds spent in the 
devastation ring are optimal for quicker economic recovery but less feasible due to a lack 
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of businesses in operation. Execution of funds in the marginally and unaffected areas 
provides better service and more access to resources, but less of that money flows into the 
devastation and threat rings where it is needed most to revitalize economic activity. 
Execution of funds in the threat ring provides the most optimal mixture of resources and 
funds execution. The resources available may be of lower quality or be less available in 
this ring than in the marginally affected or unaffected areas. However, the funds go 
directly to the threat ring that surrounds the devastation ring, allowing for funds to be 
infused closer to where economic stimulation is needed the most.   
The purpose of the “objective” section is to reiterate how the “what, when, who, 
how, and where” sections of the execution phase achieve a specific LOE. In essence, it is 
the “why” question that answers the question, “Why does this OCS solution benefit the 
commander?” The answer is, “This OCS solution helps the commander achieve LOE X 
by doing A, B, and C.” Demonstration of how effective the OCS solution is in helping a 
commander meet their desired end state is the topic of the next phase, the measurement 
phase.  
E. MEASUREMENT 
The OCS Impact Evaluation Tool offers a planner the ability to develop a 
structured planning and execution process for developing an adequate OCS solution for a 
given contingency. However, these two aspects alone only provide the means for an OCS 
solution to be implemented. Without the ability to understand if the OCS solution is 
implemented properly, if the solution is effective (in the way that it was intended to be), 
and what impact the solution has on the overall environment, the true range of support 
that OCS provides to commanders is unable to be demonstrated. Furthermore, without 
measurement capability, the DOD is primed to continue recent trends of ineffective spend 
in contingency environments. The measurement phase of the OCS Impact Evaluation 
Tool discusses measures of performance (if the solution is occurring), measures of 
effectiveness (if the solution is effective), and an overall impact analysis (how the change 
has impacted the overall environment).  
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The function of the MOP section is to address how relevant stakeholders know if 
personnel are executing the OCS solution. Planners should expand this section to include 
what information is collected and by whom. MOPs are specific and measurable; the 
following are some examples: 
• number of indigenous military-age males employed 
• number of hours employed 
• number of IED attacks on specific route 
• number of small-business contracts executed in a specific region 
These MOPs or outputs measure whether an OCS solution/activities is producing 
anything at all. This is not a clear measure of whether an activity is contributing to the 
mission objective. These outputs are raw numbers that provide an indication of 
performance but are not in a form to assess the effectiveness of the impact.  
Once the baseline data and MOPs have been gathered, planners are able to assess 
the effectiveness of the OCS solution and provide data-driven decisions of whether to 
continue or terminate a specific OCS solution. The point of the MOE section is to address 
how relevant stakeholders know how effective the OCS solution is helping to achieve the 
desired end state. While it is important to know whether the OCS solution is being 
executed, it is more meaningful to understand how effective the OCS solutions are at 
achieving a commander’s desired end state. The following could be examples of MOEs: 
• percentage change in IEDs found on target route compared to base data 
• percentage decrease in idle time of selected demographic compared to 
base  
• percentage decrease in military force killed/injured by IEDs on given route 
• percentage increase in small-business creation from previous year 
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The MOE or outcome portion of the result chain is able to translate raw data into 
insightful information about the outputs’ effects on LOEs/commander’s intent.  
The function of the Overall Impact Analysis section is to address how relevant 
stakeholders will know what impact the OCS solution has on the overall environment. 
Commanders have short- and long-term objectives, but typically the short-term objective 
requires the most immediate action and attention. Thus, many of the decisions made have 
a short-term focus.  
A good example is the employment of military-age males for COIN objectives. 
One of the main objectives of this employment strategy is to keep the local military-age 
males busy and reduce their idle time and susceptibility to extremist recruitment. This is a 
short-term objective that is achieved through OCS tasks like contracts executed for the 
employment of the local population. This employment solution has short-term impacts 
that the MOPs indicate are being executed and the MOEs indicate are effective relative to 
its baseline. However, the increase of employment under government contracts may have 
resulted in reduced employment of the traditional economic driver sectors in the region. 
This OCS solution has achieved a short-term economic/military objective, but the overall 
impact on the economy and local population will likely turn negative once the military 
pulls out of the region.  
The overall impact analysis seeks to address how the OCS solution impacts the 
contingency outside of the LOEs and other commander-desired end states. Final 
outcomes are able to objectively measure whether the proposed OCS solution has had the 
intended effect on the LOE/commander’s intent. This needs to be carefully manifested as 
to not create an embedded bias or disregard unintended consequences.  
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IV. APPLICATION OF OCS IMPACT EVALUATION TOOL 
A. APPLICATION OF OCS IMPACT EVALUATION TOOL ON HA/DR 
CONTINGENCY 
Hurricane Tabitha is a Category 5 hurricane that is set to make landfall in the Gulf 
Coast area, specifically, New Orleans, in approximately 48 hours. You are recommended 
as an expert in the field of OCS and are attached to United States Northern Command. 
You are assigned OPLAN 2017-02, the plan for hurricanes striking the Gulf Coast and 
are asked to review the plan for sufficient incorporation of OCS principles. The hurricane 
is a declared a contingency and FEMA and other federal agencies are calling for DOD 
assistance. Figure 14 indicates the projected damage assessment for the state of Louisiana 
and acts as a starting point for contingency response planning.  
 
Figure 14.  Projected Damage of Hurricane. Source: 
State Library of Louisiana (2016). 
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1. Planning 
The OCS Impact Evaluation Tool begins with the planning phase, consisting of a 
statement of the commander’s lines of effort (end state), the commander’s intents for a 
given area, and the execution of a PMESII-PT analysis on the operational environment. 
These components serve as inputs into the execution phase of the OCS Impact Evaluation 
Tool. 
a. LOE and Commander’s Intent 
The planner assesses the big picture and determines the overarching strategy for a 
given contingency. In this case, the LOE is to “respond efficiently to maximize 
preservation of life, infrastructure and capital.” More specifically, the commander’s 
intent is to preserve life and thus “ensure all non-essential personnel are evacuated 
before, during, and after the contingency.” Another intent that is derived is to “maximize 
the promotion of economic growth to support infrastructure and capital recovery in the 
affected region.” In Figure 15, the planner has developed the desired end state and the 
two intents that the commander must achieve in order to successfully fulfill the desired 
end state. 
 
Figure 15.  HA/DR Scenario LOE and Commander’s Intent 
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b. PMESII-PT Analysis 
The next step in the planning phase requires the planner to conduct a PMESII-PT 
analysis for the given contingency environment to better understand the various 
characteristics of the AOR. Figure 16 provides a brief analysis of the operational 
environment. 
 
Figure 16.   HA/DR Scenario PMESII-PT Analysis 
c. Planning Inputs 
From the planning phase accomplishments, we are able to understand our fiscal, 
time, and political capabilities and constraints. While the DOD is providing assistance, 
they are at the direction of the state and FEMA oversight. The physical environment is 
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understood, and areas that are under sea level are identified. The economic factors are 
understood and are considered when crafting OCS solutions so that the area is revitalized 
as quickly as possible. The socioeconomic status of much of the inner-city population is a 
concern because they may not have a means to exit the city prior to the storm’s landfall. 
There are vast amounts of data on the population and the area, and the declaration of 
contingency improves the power of the inputs in terms of contracting capabilities and 
resources. Examples of input statistics are the number of commercial bus companies and 
lodging facilities in the various rings (devastation, threat, marginal, unaffected), the 
estimated number of citizens who require evacuation and lodging, and the budget for 
emergency funds to support disaster relief.  
2. Execution 
The execution phase begins with the selection of an OCS solution given the inputs 
acquired from the planning phase. The first OCS solution selected is the strategic 
application of lodging—focusing mainly on hotels—for displaced residents in order to 
more efficiently stabilize and rebuild the economic productivity of the region. The second 
specific OCS solution is the emergency evacuation of displaced residents in the impacted 
areas, with an emphasis on busing as the primary mode of transportation.  
a. Lodging Selection for Response and Evacuation 
Contracting within a certain location provides a significant improvement to a 
suddenly depressed economic region. Typically, there are areas of devastation where 
there are no operable business or hotels. This is the devastation ring. Outside the 
devastation ring are those areas that are affected by the contingency, but have not 
suffered the same degree of destruction and contain businesses and hotels that remain 
operational. For purposes of analysis, this is the threat ring. Lastly, there are the 
marginally affected and unaffected rings, which include all areas surrounding the threat 
ring that have had little to no damage or loss from the contingency. Regardless of the 
physical damage, all areas are affected economically by the contingency and thus the 
primary concern of responders cannot just be the physical response, but must also focus 
on the short- and long-term economic response and recovery of the region. In reference to 
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Figure 14 illustrating the affected regions, the red and orange areas refer to the 
devastation ring, the yellow is the threat ring, and the green are the marginally or 
unaffected rings. The following discussion represents the development of a specific task 
as it relates to the OCS Impact Evaluation Tool.  
After choosing a specific task, contracting for hotel services, the planner assesses 
how that solution will impact the local area and link the solution back to a commander’s 
intent. The government, as a part of its relief packages, provides vouchers for these hotel 
services that they have contracted. Matters to consider when looking at mass lodging 
requirements in a contingency environment include shortages of supply of hotels, 
prioritization of accommodations, and the ability of hotels to support internal operations 
throughout the contingency. 
As stated previously, timing is critical in HA/DR environments. In this scenario, 
the OCS recommendation needs to be made immediately. The goal is to have the local 
population that does not have the means to pay for temporary accommodations be 
provided hotel vouchers as quickly as possible in order to stay to stay at reserved rooms 
at contracted hotels and to complete the movement prior to landfall.  
The first priority-targeted populations are those who are unable to use their own 
means to pay for accommodations, including the homeless, elderly in nursing homes, or 
medically disabled. The secondary group of personnel are relief responders. This is 
important because this group of people will be able to provide relief in the form of 
physical support but also in terms of dollar spend in the area. They will be effectively 
increasing the cash flow to the hotels, the suppliers of the hotels, and the local area, 
which again supports economic regrowth. 
This solution is accomplished through the execution of a multiple-award IDIQ 
contract vehicle or multiple blanket purchase agreements allowing as many businesses as 
possible to participate. Vouchers are provided to those who are unable to pay for their 
own accommodations. Risks are considered when vetting the participation of hotels. For 
instance, the hotels closest to the devastation ring provide the greatest economic return on 
investment; however, they come with the greatest level of risk, specifically, the risk of 
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the hotel being destroyed or otherwise unable to support the displaced citizens. This 
means that hotels may have the ability to put people in rooms, but they do not have 
electricity, sanitary water, food, or other basic life support that is of adequate contract 
standards. Contract terms and conditions govern whether a basic room is sufficient for 
participation in the program or if all basic life support functions are required.  
As mentioned previously, the closer to the devastation ring, the better, but also the 
riskier. The threat ring provides the ideal opportunity for accommodations with proximity 
to the devastation ring. The goal is to create situations in which hotels are constantly at 
capacity in order to maximize funds spent in the region. Once hotels in the threat ring are 
at capacity, then it is time to expand to the marginally affected regions, and finally the 
unaffected regions. The mixture of relief personnel to displaced citizens is important. 
Placing relief responders who have the ability to spend relief dollars in the affected 
region closer to the affected region enhances the effectiveness of that responder. Placing 
a homeless member of the devastation ring in the closest hotel to the devastation ring 
meets the intent on safely housing the member, but it does not provide as much of a 
return on investment as the previous example of a relief responder.  
Instead of busing displaced residents to far away government installations or 
building tent cities, the objective is to use the remaining local lodging facilities outside 
the devastation ring to spur economic activity and jumpstart economic recovery. This 
objective relates back to the commander’s intent to “maximize the promotion of 
economic growth to support infrastructure and capital recovery in the affected region.” 
The government has the organic capability to house displaced personnel whether in brick 
and mortar government installations or in constructed tent cities. However, “other than 
cost” factors need to be addressed. Some of these factors include response time, 
supportability, and ability to promote economic growth in the region. Although remote, 
external tent cities or government installations might be more sustainable in the short 
term due to access to resources and an unaffected supplier base, they do not provide as 
effective economic stimulation to the affected region. The dollars spent will go to 
businesses that have been marginally or unaffected by the devastation rather than the 
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businesses that have been significantly impacted, and thus will not have the economic 
impact desired on the affected region that is consistent with the commander’s intent.  
b. Emergency Evacuation of Displaced Residents  
Lessons learned from previous disaster relief contingency operations indicate the 
need for improved planning for primary contingency evacuation routes, methods, and 
timelines. For purposes of analysis, busing for evacuation is considered the primary 
method of evacuation. For many planners, tasks like transportation of displaced residents 
are covered by an organic capability of the federal, state, or municipal governmental 
organization that may be heading the operation. OCS may not have been involved in the 
planning process. This results in inadequate preparation for the requirement of additional 
transportation. Just because an organic capability exists does not mean it will be the best 
alternative to achieving the desired end state for a given AOR. Thus, regardless of 
whether an organic capability exists, the OCS solutions must be, at the very least, thought 
through in case the organic capability is no longer operational or able to meet necessary 
timelines.  
After choosing a specific task, contracting for bus services, the planner assesses 
how that solution will impact the local area and link the solution back to a commander’s 
intent. By focusing on one variable, the analysis can become more streamlined and 
controlled in an often-chaotic environment. Matters to consider when looking at mass 
transportation are congestion of the evacuation routes, gas shortages, and excess demand 
for busses. 
Timing is especially important in a HA/DR environment. The OCS 
recommendation needs to be made immediately in this case to allow those responsible for 
execution the ability to choose between their organic capabilities or the OCS solution, or 
some combination of the two. In addition, it takes time for either the organic capability to 
mobilize or for contractors to position their assets. The evacuations need to occur prior to 
landfall of the hurricane and after the all-clear has been signaled. These buses are used as 
much as possible for as long as possible after a hurricane to continue providing 
productive cash flow to local business entities.  
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There are many options for contracting for bus transportation; however, the funds 
used for buses would have the most significant impact if used to contract with local 
tourism, school, and other business entities that have buses within the threat ring. This 
directly impacts, in a positive way, stimulation of the economy in a region that is 
negatively impacted economically after the hurricane. 
The primary contract vehicle is a multiple-award IDIQ contract. This provides the 
government with flexibility to surge requirements if necessary, but more importantly, 
allows for increased participation by more business entities, thus promoting economic 
growth. Other considerations include how to increase the effectiveness of the contractors 
in terms of helping them succeed in a contingency environment. For example, can we 
guarantee contractors consistent access to gasoline? Furthermore, can we procure 
gasoline from companies within the threat ring prior to landfall of the hurricane to 
provide to contractors? Just because a contractor can provide a bus does not mean they 
can support the operation of a bus in a resource-constrained contingency environment.  
As already mentioned, the contract vehicle is a multiple-award IDIQ, which 
provides the flexibility to contract where the most impact could be felt. The threat ring 
provides the most significant impact to the local community. This area is significantly 
affected but not damaged as much as those businesses in the devastation ring. Contracting 
within the devastation ring is preferred but carries much more risk because the businesses 
there are not guaranteed to make it through the storm. Contracting within the threat ring 
allows the cash to flow back into the devastation ring quicker than it would if contracted 
in the marginally affected, unaffected, or even remote external contractors or organic 
options.  
The objective section relates how this OCS solution helps achieve the 
commander’s intent, thus the LOE. In this respect, the objective of this contract is to 
“ensure all non-essential personnel can be evacuated before, during, and after the 
contingency” with a secondary objective to effectively execute funds in areas that 
promote quicker economic regrowth. What is important to note is that the military has an 
organic capability of buses, Humvees, trucks, and so forth. However, having an organic 
solution available does not alleviate the planner of the responsibility to consider the OCS 
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solution. Planners evaluate cost when choosing organic capability over contracted 
solutions but must also evaluate other factors such as response time, bandwidth, and 
increased cash flow to the economy. The OCS solution may be more expensive in the 
short run but is an option that will bring long-term strategic value. If this long-run benefit 
is demonstrated and validated, it is easier to justify the heightened short-term cost. Lastly, 
while the ideal solution is to contract all funds through the affected regions, that is simply 
not feasible. Thus, planners must consider some responsible mixture of contracting 
within the affected region and contracting externally.  
3. Measurement 
Measurement of the OCS solution is vital to assessing the effectiveness that the 
proposed solution has on the mission objectives and enabling decision makers to continue 
or deviate from that solution. In this section of the OCS Impact Analysis Tool, we 
provide a brief discussion of the measurement considerations for the selected OCS 
solutions discussed previously.  
a. Lodging (Hotels) 
The steps taken during the input stages determine whether there was adequate 
baseline data to begin the assessment. Larger nearby cities outside the devastation ring 
are analyzed for potential use of their lodging facilities. Data points such as number of 
potential hotels, average rates per night, and their maximum occupancy rates are some of 
the inputs that make up the baseline data.  
The MOP is a raw number data point that tells us about the output of the solution 
or task. This information is insightful but mostly tells us whether or not the solution or 
task is producing anything at all. Examples of MOPs are 
• number of hotel rooms filled 
• number of citizens lodged 
• number of dollars spent on lodging program 
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For this OCS task, our MOP/Output is the number of hotel rooms filled with 
evacuated personnel. For the purpose of this scenario, we estimate 8,500 personnel 
received hotel rooms. This data point is not insightful because it provides no context to 
how many people attempted to get a room or needed a room. However, it is a good 
starting point.  
We now incorporate the base line data to demonstrate the impact this output had 
on the targeted population through the use of MOEs. Some examples of MOEs are 
• percentage of evacuated citizens lodged 
• percentage of vacant hotel rooms filled 
• percentage of relief dollars spent in hotel sector 
For this OCS solution, we focus on the MOE of percentage of evacuated citizens 
lodged. We estimate that 10,000 people require evacuation and need lodging for 3–4 days 
until the storm passed. The OCS solution is to find local lodging facilities and provide 
vouchers to the evacuated personnel to stay there. With 8,500 personnel being lodged, we 
have an effectiveness rate of 85%. This information lets us see the impact of our policy 
and quantify how successful we were at lodging the displaced residents. From this data, 
we understand that organic solutions need to augment the available OCS solution in order 
to achieve closer to the 100% solution.  
The final step in the measurement process is to assess how the increased rate of 
lodged citizens affects or will affect the overall sight picture. Were all the personnel that 
used the hotels actual in need of them? After the storm, were these hotels that were 
contracted able to rebuild their infrastructure better than those who did not? Here we can 
analyze intended and unintended consequences and help planners assess the second- and 
third-order effects of OCS solutions. Was placing relief workers in hotels closer to the 
impact more beneficial for economic recovery? How effective was this solution at 
shortening the recovery timeline? Here, we assess whether the outcome matches the 
commander’s intent by an established causal relationship and identify the other outcomes 
the program or solution may have. We are able to demonstrate the effect on the threat 
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ring lodging facilities and the ability to jumpstart their economic recovery from the use of 
the local businesses.  
b. Transportation (Busing)  
The steps taken during the input stages determine whether there was adequate 
baseline data collected. These data points are the number of bus companies who are 
eligible to participate, the number of people eligible to be evacuated, the economic 
indicators like amount of dollars going into certain industries prior to the hurricane, or 
number of people employed by those industries.  
Next, we establish the MOPs. The MOP is a raw number data point that tells us 
about the output of the solution or task. This information is insightful but mostly tells us 
whether or not the solution or task is producing anything at all. The following are 
examples of MOPs: 
• How many buses were contracted?  
• How many different companies provided buses?  
• How many people were evacuated by these buses?  
Our specific MOP for this OCS solution is “how many busses were contracted 
for?” The result of the OCS solution is the provision of 30 buses.  
Next, we establish MOEs and assess the effectiveness of the implemented OCS 
solution. Some possible MOEs are 
• percentage of evacuated citizens 
• percentage of relief dollars spent on affected busing companies 
• percentage of organic transportation returned to the commander 
For this scenario, the MOE is the percentage of evacuated citizens. We estimate 
given the baseline data that 10,000 people require evacuation assistance. The MOP is 30 
buses, which were contracted out with a capacity of 25 seats per bus. Thus, if these 
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busses are able to complete 10 trips, we are able to evacuate 7,500/10,000, or 75% of the 
personnel. This is consistent with the commander’s intent. However, from this data, a 
course of action change is required to meet the goal of all 10,000 personnel evacuated. 
Thus, either organic capabilities need to be implemented, or more busses need to be 
contracted to meet the overall desired end state.  
Lastly, the overall impact measures the effect that the increased evacuation rate 
has on the larger picture outcomes. Were all the personnel evacuated in a timely manner? 
After the storm, were these businesses that were contracted with for buses able to rebuild 
their infrastructure better than those who did not? Here we can analyze intended and 
unintended consequences and help planners see the second- and third-order effects of the 
OCS solution. Did the successful evacuation of American citizens strengthen public 
support and instruments of national power? Was the area that was targeted for relief 
funding able to infuse money into the devastation ring faster than marginal or unaffected 
areas? We assess whether the outcome matches the commander’s intent by an established 
causal relationship and identify the other outcomes the program or solution may have. 
B. APPLICATION OF OCS IMPACT EVALUATION TOOL ON 
TRADITIONAL MILITARY CONFLICT  
The Pacific Command (PACOM) OCSIC personnel have received word that new 
operations are going to commence in the Zamundan1 Peninsula (Belzberg & Landis, 
1988) in order to support allied interests against a sudden movement of North Zamundan 
Forces against South Zamunda, a United Nations (UN) ally. The Joint Task Force (JTF) 
is contemplating multiple solutions to evacuate non-essential personnel from major cities 
like Zeoul, while trying to decide how best to get his troops and cargo North to meet the 
advancing threat. In addition, the North Zamundan indigenous population presents a 
unique threat to the JTF commander. Years of relative isolation from the global 
environment has created uncertainty in the motives and incentives of the local population. 
As such, the JTF is wondering what some possible OCS recommendations for the region 
might be, and how they could help the commander achieve his desired end state in the 
                                                 
1 Zamunda is a fictional country from the motion picture Coming to America 
 55 
region. The commander has asked to be briefed on two possible contracted solutions that 
he could have in his arsenal of options.  
1. Planning 
The OCS Impact Evaluation Tool begins with the planning phase, consisting of a 
statement of the commander’s line of effort (end state), a statement of the commander’s 
intent for a given scenario, and the execution of a PMESII-PT analysis of the operational 
environment. These serve as inputs into the Impact Evaluation portion of the OCS Impact 
Evaluation Tool. 
a. LOE and Commander’s Intent 
The planners assess the big picture and determine the overarching strategy for a 
given contingency. In this case, the line of effort is to “respond efficiently to maximize 
preservation of life and create stable and secure region.” More specifically, a portion of 
the commander’s intent is to preserve life and thus “ensure all non-essential personnel 
can be evacuated before North Zamundan aggression can impact the local population.” 
Another intent is to “maximize the likelihood of a non-insurgent region.” The planner has 
now developed the desired end state, along with two intents that the commander must 
achieve in order to successfully fulfill the desired end state (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 17.  Traditional Military Conflict Scenario LOE and Commander’s Intent 
b. PMESII-PT Analysis 
The planner now conducts a PMESII-PT analysis for the given contingency 
environment to better understand the various characteristics of the AOR. The Figure 18 
provides a brief analysis of the operational environment. 
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Figure 18.  Traditional Military Conflict Scenario PMESII-PT Analysis 
c. Planning Inputs 
From the planning phase accomplishments, we understand our fiscal, time and 
political capabilities and constraints. The economic factors are understood and are 
considered when crafting OCS solutions to maximize their effectiveness. The distance 
between North Zamunda and Zeoul is of great concern. Time is a major factor to consider 
in the evacuation of noncombatants. While the South Zamundans in Zeoul may possess 
the resources to evacuation, the sheer number of individuals evacuating at the same time 
will cause mass congestion. In addition, South Zamundan and U.S. forces will 
subsequently be unable to advance North due to the road congestion. The socioeconomic 
status of much of the North Zamundan population is a concern because they may not 
have the ability to access information and resources, or be able to form self-sustaining 
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villages post occupation of U.S./South Zamunda forces. There are vast amounts of data 
for the South Zamundan population and economy, but equally lacking data on the 
population and true economic status of North Zamunda. This will improve the power of 
the inputs in terms of contracting capabilities and resources able to be provided in the 
evacuation efforts in South Zamundan, while acting as a detriment to the employment 
opportunities executed in North Zamunda.  
Examples of input statistics for the evacuation portion of this analysis are the 
number of commercial plane companies in the region, number of aircraft, amount of fuel 
availability, estimated number of citizens who will require evacuation, number of airports 
in the region, and round-trip time of the commercial aircraft from Zeoul to a designated 
safe area. Examples of input statistics for the employment portion of this analysis are the 
number of businesses in the village region, the number of unemployed workers, and the 
average wage of the worker.  
2. Execution 
The planner begins by selecting an OCS solution given the inputs from the 
planning phase. The first OCS solution is a contracted solution for a Non-Combatant 
Evacuation Operations (NEO) Plan within the impacted areas, with an emphasis on the 
strategic application of employment, focusing on the development of a Department of 
Transportation in North Zamunda to help displaced residents more efficiently stabilize 
and rebuild the economic productivity of the region as well as to deter the onset of 
insurgent behavior.  
a. OCS NEO Plan 
OCS is not just a gap filler or support function but is an important option for 
delivering the commander’s desired effect. As such, a contracted solution provides the 
commander the ability to achieve the same end state using a contracted solution as they 
could with organic force deployment. The OCS solution recommends contracting for 
commercial transportation, specifically focusing on airlines, in order to replace or 
significantly augment the use of organic aircraft assigned to evacuation missions. The 
airlines operate out of Zeoul, South Zamunda, and an assumption exists that the various 
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Zamundan and regional airlines will agree to assume the risk of flying in potentially 
hostile environments. For purposes of this analysis, airlines are the primary mode of 
transportation.  
After choosing a specific task, contracting for airline services, the planner 
assesses how that solution will impact the local area and link the solution back to a 
commander’s intent. By focusing on one variable, the analysis can become more 
streamlined and better controlled in an often-chaotic environment. Matters to consider 
when looking at mass transportation are congestion of the evacuation routes, speed of 
transportation versus cost, and excess demand for airlines.  
The recommendation is made, immediately in this case, to allow those responsible 
for execution the ability to choose between their organic capabilities or the OCS solution, 
or some combination of the two. In addition, it takes time for either organic capability to 
mobilize or for contractors to position their assets. The evacuations need to occur prior to 
aggression from North Zamunda. As previously stated, the proximity of North Zamunda 
allows for near instantaneous artillery strikes against Zeoul. 
There are many options for contracting for air transportation; however, the funds 
used to contract with local airlines and airlines with direct economic ties to Zeoul and 
other Northern-based airlines would have the most significant impact on the region. 
These contracts would directly impact, in a positive way, stimulation of the economy in a 
region that is negatively impacted economically after Northern aggression is displayed. 
Other stakeholders, including the organic airline community, are addressed to see what 
implications things like increased air traffic or runway congestion have on military 
operations.  
The primary contract vehicle is a multiple-award IDIQ contract. This provides the 
government with flexibility to surge requirements if necessary, but more importantly, 
allows for increased participation by more business entities, thus promoting economic 
growth. Other considerations are how to increase the effectiveness of the contractors in 
terms of helping them succeed in a contingency environment. Just because a contractor 
can provide air transportation doesn’t mean they can support the operation of a plane in a 
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resource-constrained contingency environment. Will they have enough gasoline? Will 
their maintenance personnel remain behind to provide service?  
As stated previously, the contract vehicle is a multiple-award IDIQ, which 
provides the flexibility to contract where the most impact could be felt. The Zeoul region 
provides the most significant impact to the local economy and since it is such a large 
economic driver, to the rest of the country as well. This area is significantly affected by 
Northern aggression due to the proximity of Zeoul to the North. Contracting airlines to 
operate in Zeoul for evacuations is preferred since the majority of the populace unable to 
evacuate would be located in the urban Zeoul environment. However, the assumption is 
made that the airlines would fly in hostile environments. While the South and the United 
States would likely maintain air superiority, there will be other risks like artillery attacks 
that may cause the contracted airline to back out of its contract. 
The objective is consistent with how this OCS solution will help achieve the 
commander’s intent and thus the LOE. In this respect, the objective of this contract is to 
“ensure all non-essential personnel can be evacuated before North Zamundan aggression 
can impact the population,” with a secondary objective to effectively execute funds in 
areas that will promote quicker economic regrowth. What is important to note is that the 
military has an organic capability of aircraft, buses, and trucks that are likely earmarked 
for the NEO plan. We have already thought about the discussion between organic and 
inorganic capability and the trade-off between the two. The objective of this OCS 
solution isn’t necessarily to be faster or to increase the rate of evacuations, but to return 
capacity to the military. While cost may be the primary factor for choosing the organic 
capability over contracted solutions, cost may pale in comparison to gaining additional 
military airlift or truck capacity. In addition, contracting out aircraft assists in alleviating 
some of the road congestion, thus increasing the rate of travel for military assets from the 
South to North. The OCS solution may be more expensive in the short run but is an 
option that will bring long-term strategic value in terms of increased troops and 
equipment to halt advancing Northern troops. If this long-run benefit is demonstrated and 
validated, it is easier to justify the heightened short-term cost. Lastly, while the ideal 
solution is to contract all funds through the affected regions, that is simply not feasible. 
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Thus, planners must consider some responsible mixture of contracting within the affected 
region and contracting externally.  
b. Employment of Military-Age Males 
OIF is an example of the substantial risk associated with disbanding an 
indigenous military without properly providing alternative employment opportunities. In 
addition, not understanding the local norms, customs, culture, economy, and incentive 
structures results in negative impacts and the creation of insurgent populations. 
Regardless of how it occurs, war creates a pool of excess indigenous labor that is 
motivated and incentivized to provide for their families. Thus, in the absence of 
legitimate employment opportunities, these members become susceptible to recruitment 
by various extremist groups in need of increased military capability and capacity. The 
assumption is that the North Zamundans will eventually adopt tactics similar to those 
presented in Iraq and Afghanistan, using insurgency to protract the conflict and erode the 
allied public support. The goal of this OCS solution is to provide alternative forms of 
employment that meet a military mission objective while also contributing to positive and 
sustainable economic growth in the targeted region. For purposes of this analysis, the 
creation of a Department of Transportation is the focus of job employment.  
After choosing a specific task, contracting for Department of Transportation 
services, the planner assesses how that solution will impact the local area and link that 
solution back to a commander’s intent. The goal is to hire a contractor from an affected 
region like Zeoul, and require them to hire labor from the local North Zamundan villages 
to create and maintain traversable roads that allow for free movement of transportation. 
Matters to consider when looking at transportation employment requirements in a 
contingency environment are possible shortage of supply of skilled workers, shortage of 
expertise, and lack of resources to implement transportation improvements.  
Timing the execution of this OCS solution is coordinated with various 
stakeholders. However, prior to military victory, a contract is executed with a contractor 
in Zeoul for the creation and execution of a Department of Transportation–like service. 
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Once a major military victory is achieved, or once the level of risk is suitable for 
contracted personnel, the hired contractor begins operations and reconstruction.  
There are stakeholders from multiple agencies, including the DOD and DOS. In 
addition, there are two targeted groups in this analysis: the contractor and the laborer. The 
contractor is hired from a region that has been affected by this conflict. This provides an 
economic return and stimulates growth. A requirement in the contract states that the 
contractor shall use local village labor capacity when it exists. Thus, the second targeted 
group is that of military-age men in the Northern villages. This group is the most 
susceptible group to insurgent North Zamundan or incoming extremist group propaganda 
and recruitment for insurgency. If employed, paid, and able to take care of their families, 
however, the likelihood of recruitment decreases. The military-age male is also, typically, 
the most capable of performing military action in an insurgent state.  
This solution is accomplished through the execution of a single-award IDIQ 
contract vehicle allowing for a prime contractor to manage task orders for each of the 
various villages. The contract is for street repair, maintenance, construction, and other 
various requirements for the successful implementation of a transportation network. The 
task orders can be regionally based or on a “by-village” basis. Some risk associated with 
this solution is the lack of construction expertise or resources of the target demographic. 
Traditionally, North Zamundan infrastructure lacks any significant investment and 
maintains a poor infrastructure with even less expertise. Finding the expertise to assist 
local village military-aged men is a prime contractor responsibility and vital to the 
success of the solution. Provisions in the contract could allow for a mentor type program 
to be put in place such that the North Zamundan companies that form as a result of the 
work being done can eventually take over the contract, providing sustainable jobs for the 
local populace. This decreases reliance of North Zamunda on U.S. contracts and allows 
for an easier exit of U.S. troops from the region.  
The prime contractor implements a focused approach on transportation networks. 
The transportation system focuses first on transportation routes linking the South to the 
North and along vital supply lines. Once major combat has concluded, transportation 
within major cities is the primary focus followed by the development of a highway 
 63 
system to connect them. Starting the transportation creation and maintenance in the larger 
cities, where most businesses are likely to reside, provides a larger economic impact to 
the region than starting off in remote villages where the economic activity is much more 
isolated, if present at all.  
This objective relates back to the commander’s intent to “maximize the likelihood 
of a non-insurgent region.” However, this OCS solution really has many more objectives 
than promoting counterinsurgency. Economic growth in both South and North Zamunda 
are vital to increasing the stability in the region and creating an increased likelihood for 
long-term security in the region. The objective is to decrease the susceptibility of 
military-age males to recruitment for insurgent purposes. Keeping them employed, 
understanding what motivates them, and creating jobs that are sustainable are the first 
steps to achieving that goal. The military learned from OEF and OIF that creating jobs for 
the local population does allow for decreased susceptibility for recruitment of military-
age men by extremist groups. The employment met the military objective of decreasing 
their idle time and it was done through employment. However, we also learned that when 
the U.S. military left those regions, so did the jobs, and the unemployment spiked, and 
the number of susceptible recruits skyrocketed. By looking at the sustainability of this 
solution, we can see that not only is there work to be done at the tactical level (i.e., road 
construction), but there is a sustainable future of work with the development of a 
highway system and maintenance of roads for years to come. This provides for a short-
term military objective to be met while troops are on the ground, and for long-term 
economic and stability objectives to be met long after the U.S. troops have left.  
3. Measurement 
The measurement of OCS solution is about assessing the effectiveness of the 
proposed solution on the mission objectives and enabling decision makers to continue or 
deviate from that solution. The following measurement section of the OCS Impact 
Analysis Tool provides a brief discussion of the measurement considerations for the 
selected OCS solutions.  
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a. NEO Plan  
The steps taken during the input stages determine whether there was adequate 
baseline data. Some questions to consider when collecting baseline data include the 
following: How many personnel require evacuation? How quickly should these personnel 
be evacuated? How can we maximize the most number of people evacuated as quickly as 
possible? What mix of commercial and military aircraft will be required to adequately 
evacuate all personnel? Collecting or establishing this baseline data is best performed by 
a team of economists or a certified evaluation team. Currently, this is not a function that 
can be adequately accomplished by a military entity. In this scenario, we establish 
baseline data that states 52 aircraft will be utilized for evacuation assistance. The OCS 
solution is to contract with local and regional airline companies.  
The MOP/outputs for this scenario are raw data numbers and are not descriptive 
of the impact of the proposed OCS solutions on the mission. This scenario focuses on the 
MOP of number of personnel that were evacuated. The following are some possible 
alternative examples of MOPs: 
• How many commercial airlines were utilized?  
• How many personnel were evacuated? 
• What were the timelines of the evacuations?  
The next step is to assess the effectiveness of the OCS solution through the use of 
MOEs. The MOEs measure whether the OCS solution was effective for its intended 
purpose. Some example MOEs for this scenario are 
• percentage of airlift returned to commander 
• percentage of cargo space returned to commander 
• percentage of flight time returned to commander 
This scenario focuses on the percent of airlift returned to commanders. In this 
scenario, we were able to contract with four separate airline companies for 38 aircraft for 
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a 73% effectiveness rating. Thus, 73% of the planned organic capability is effectively 
returned to the commander for alternate missions. To drive the impact home, the 
commander now has an increase of 73% aircraft capacity to move troops, gear, and 
equipment North to halt North Zamundan aggression faster and with increased force.  
The overall impact/final outcome measures the returned airlift percentage against 
the larger picture outcomes of the commander’s objectives. Were all the personnel 
evacuated in a timely manner? Were commercial contracts effectively utilized to free up 
military aircraft for military operations? Here we can analyze intended and unintended 
consequences and help planners see the second- and third-order effects of OCS solutions. 
What was the percentage increase in troops or equipment that was able to be advanced 
North due to the increased capacity? What effect did that have on the length of the 
conflict? Planners assess whether the outcome matches the commander’s intent by an 
established causal relationship and identify what other outcomes the program or solution 
may have.  
b. Employment of Military-Age Males 
The steps taken during the input stages determine whether there was adequate 
baseline data collected. Data points such as number of military-age males, amount of 
existing infrastructure and the current state of that infrastructure, and the current level of 
technical expertise of the target population make up the inputs for this scenario. We 
estimate 5,000 military-age males would be eligible for this program.  
The MOP/outputs for this scenario are raw data numbers and are not descriptive 
of the impact of the proposed OCS solutions on the mission. Some possible examples of 
MOPs are 
• number of military-age males receiving employment  
• number of roads constructed/repaired 
• number of insurgent actions against friendly troops 
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For this scenario, we focus on the number of military-age men employed as the 
specific MOP. This number itself provides a data point to show whether or not the 
employment function has occurred. In order to see how effective the OCS solution is, 
planners now develop MOEs. The development of MOEs to measure the impact of this 
solution is vital to understanding whether the OCS solution is having the intended impact 
on the desired end state. In this scenario, possible MOEs are 
• percentage change in insurgent actions 
• percentage change in military-age men responsible for insurgent actions 
• percentage increase in transportation sector of North Zamundan economy 
We focus on the MOE of percentage change in military-age men responsible for 
insurgent attacks for this scenario. If we were able to contract with 3,800 of these males, 
the result is a 76% effectiveness rating. Depending on the collection of data, we could 
infer that the 76% increase in employment of that target demographic had a positive 
economic impact and decrease in insurgent activity for that particular demographic.  
The overall impact analyzes where the decrease in insurgent activity is assessed 
against the larger picture outcomes. How does this affect the post-war terrorism 
recruitment levels? What would have happened if this program were not executed? What 
is happening with the military-age males who we were not able to employ? Here we can 
analyze intended and unintended consequences and help planners see the second- and 
third-order effects of OCS solutions. Were the jobs created in the transportation industry 
sustainable? Was the pay provided enough to deter recruitment? Was the OCS solution 
effective in reducing reconstruction or stability operations? Planners assess whether the 
outcome matches the commander’s intent by an established causal relationship and 
identify the other outcomes the program or solution may have.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a brief summary of Chapter II, Chapter III, and Chapter IV. 
In addition, we provide a conclusion in this chapter that contains recommendations 
derived over the course of this research. Lastly, we suggest areas for future or more in-
depth research.  
A. SUMMARY 
In Chapter II, we discuss the various elements of OCS and impact evaluations and 
dive into the literature that focuses on these subjects. The chapter begins with a technical 
discussion of OCS, and then moves to the evolution of OCS through the years. The focus 
turns next to the economic impact analysis and the collection and dissemination of data. 
In Chapter III, we discuss the methodology that planners should take when 
addressing the planning, execution, and measurement of contingencies. Chapter III 
introduces the OCS Impact Analysis Tool and briefly describes the components of that 
tool.  
Chapter IV provides the analysis of the hypothetical contingency through the use 
of the OCS Impact Evaluation Tool. The chapter begins with an assessment of the 
various components of the planning process, including the LOE and commander’s intent 
identification and the PMESII-PT analysis for the operational environment. Next, 
planners identify, develop, and link two specific OCS solutions back to a specific 
commander’s intent. Lastly, the OCS solutions are measured through the application of 
MOPs, MOE, and an overall impact analysis.  
B. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present a brief synopsis of OCS and Economic Impact 
Evaluations. We develop the OCS Impact Evaluation Tool and provide a hypothetical 
scenario for application of the tool. Our analysis has led to three recommendations.  
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This project represents an attempt to develop a more structured approach, not just 
to planning for OCS or performing impact evaluations, but to assist planners in better 
integrating OCS into plans of all level of detail. Annex Ws serve commanders better if 
OCS is not only integrated into the plan, but if OCS solutions are also linked back to a 
commander’s desired end state. While not everyone understands the contracting process 
or the value of OCS, being able to link solutions to end states provides a common sight 
picture for commanders to understand. Being able to plan for, develop solutions for, and 
then measure the impact of, a specific OCS solution provides planners and commanders 
with data to make data-informed decisions in order to achieve a desired end state. 
Recommendation 1: Disseminate the OCS Impact Evaluation Tool to 
OCSIC planners to gain feedback to better help planners link OCS 
solutions to a commander’s desired end state.  
An organic capability means that the military has the resources to perform a task, 
while an inorganic capability means the military does not possess the ability to perform a 
task and thus must outsource or contract for the task. It is important to note that just 
because an organic solution exists does not mean it is the best value alternative. 
Conversely, just because a contracted solution may result in nearly immediate results 
does not mean the cost associated with it is palatable. Understanding how those trade-offs 
affect the mission outcome is essential when making the organic versus inorganic 
solution decision.  
Recommendation 2: Create/enforce a policy that mandates OCS planning 
regardless of the existence of an organic capability. 
Lastly, we developed a tool that integrated impact evaluation and OCS as a way 
to assist planners in demonstrating the impact that OCS can have in the planning process 
and show the effectiveness of OCS solutions through the use of MOPs, MOEs, and 
Economic Impact Evaluations. Although developing a list of MOPs and MOEs might be 
helpful as a starting point for planners, the more value-added function is to gain a better 
understanding of the baseline data, the collection of the data, and the meaning behind the 
data. In addition, the Impact Evaluation process is complicated, complex, and difficult to 
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complete, even in a controlled environment. The fog and friction of war does nothing to 
help ease the difficulty of this process.  
Recommendation 3: Put trained economists with regional and subject 
matter expertise on OCSIC planning staffs to assist in OCS planning, 
execution, and measurement in order to develop value-added impact 
evaluations for data-driven decision making.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are multiple approaches we could have taken for this research and we had 
many questions arise during our research. We present the following potential areas for 
further research in the remainder of this section.  
First, we recommend further research and an in-depth analysis of how well the 
DOD teaches, learns, and understands OCS with specific consideration given to active 
duty and National Guard components—and additionally, for active duty personnel, an 
analysis of the levels of understanding at various Professional Military Education stages. 
Having the junior level officers really understand and promote the principles of OCS 
builds a foundation for tomorrow’s leaders to build upon.  
A second area for potential further research is the additional development of the 
OCS Impact Evaluation Tool to categorize contingencies and enable planners to assess a 
standardized first-tier response matrix in Annex Ws. Different types of contingencies call 
for different assets and varying utilization of those assets. While no two Annex Ws are 
the same, there could be templates created for each of the specific type of contingencies 
as starting points for planners.  
A third and final area for further research is to look at other federal agencies’ 
planning processes and identify the best practices from those plans. USAID, FEMA, and 
the Department of State all take part, in some fashion, in contingency operations. The 
DOD can use their lessons learned and implement some of their impact evaluation 
practices into its planning processes.  
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